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WIFE AND DEPENDENT CHILDREN'S RIGHT TO INVADE
THE CORPUS OF TRUST OF HUSBAND
BENEFICIARY
Culver v. Culver
112 Ohio App. 100, 169 N.E.2d 486 (1960)
The husband-settlor established an inter-vivos trust under the terms
of which the trustee bank was to pay him the net income for life. In addi-
tion, article 2 of the trust agreement provided that:
In addition to such income, the trustee is authorized, in its
absolute and uncontrolled discretion, to pay to or for the benefit
of the Grantor during his lifetime, parts of the principal of this
trust, from time to time in the event of an emergency affecting
him, his wile or children.1 (Emphasis added.)
Thereafter, marital difficulties developed and as a result of a divorce
action, the court ordered the husband to make support payments. The
husband became in arrears in his payments, and the bank was ordered
to pay the trust income to the wife. The income having been exhausted,
the wife brought the present action asking the court to determine that
an emergency existed as outlined in article 2 of the trust agreement
and to apply the corpus of the trust against the arrearages. The trial
court so ordered but the appellate court reversed, holding that the wife
and children were not entitled to invade the corpus.
Both the majority and the dissenting opinion considered the vital
issue to be whether the trustee had abused his discretion in failing to
determine that an emergency existed. It is a well recognized principle
that courts may substitute their discretion for that of the trustee where
he has abused his or is guilty of bad faith.2 The more pertinent inquiry
is whether the court passed over the vital question when it concluded
that this was a discretionary trust without identifying the characteristics of
and the requirements necessary to establish such a trust. The point is
particularly significant because recent Ohio cases suggest that were "this
trust not purely discretionary, the wife and children should be entitled
to recover.
The rights of the wife and children to invade the trust corpus depend
on the following considerations:
1. What type of trust was created?
2. If it is a spendthrift rather than discretionary trust, can the wife
and children invade notwithstanding the valid restraints on
alienation?
1 Culver v. Culver, 112 Ohio App. 100, 103, 169 N.E.2d 486, 489 (1960).
2 In re Estate of Ternansky, 141 N.E.2d 189 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957). See also
numerous cases cited in the principal case.
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A spendthrift trust is one which places a valid restraint on voluntary and
involuntary transfer of the interests of the beneficiary.3 The beneficiary does
have an interest but it cannot be reached by him or his creditors due to the
valid restraints on alienation. A discretionary trust differs with respect to the
interests of the beneficiary in that he has no interest which can be attached
by creditors or aliened by him until the trustee exercises his discretion.
It is the character of the beneficiary's interest rather than the settlor's
intention to impose a restraint on alienation which protects the trust
against invasion.4 The trustee must have the uncontrolled discretion to
determine whether to pay anything to the beneficiary. In the principal
case the trustee had discretion to determine the existence of an emergency
and then presumably 5 to pay something. Consequently, the vital charac-
teristic of the discretionary trust is missing.
In the absence of any express restraints on alienation, it is not
altogether clear that this is a spendthrift trust, but express language is
unnecessary where the intent of the settlor can be gathered from the instru-
ment as a whole." The wording of this instrument would support the
conclusion that the settlor intended to protect himself and his family, and
that, in order to achieve this purpose, he did not intend that creditors
or others would be able to invade the interests created.
Directly in point are two recent Ohio cases which involved the same
problem. In both cases the wife and children were attempting to reach
the interest of the husband-beneficiary to satisfy his support payment
arrearages. In the first, McWilliams v. McWilliams,7 although the court
3 Restatement, Trusts § 152 (2) (1959). Express recognition of the validity of
spendthrift trusts in Ohio is found in Frazier v. Wilkinson, 18 Ohio C.C.R. 363, 10
Ohio C.C. Dec. 106 (1899); Skillman v. Symes, 14 Ohio C.C.R. 547, 7 Ohio C.C. Dec.
39 (1896).
Interest includes the beneficiary's right to receive principal as well as income. The
majority of states have held that, in the absence of statute, the restraints on the bene-
ficiary's right to receive principal in the future are valid. The Skillman case held that
the restraints were valid with respect to income as well as principal.
4 Scott, Trusts 155 (2d ed. 1956). See also Restatement, Trusts § 155. Trusts of
this type have been approved by the Ohio courts: Moscowitz v. Federman, 72 Ohio
App. 149, 51 N.E.2d 48 (1943), Morris v. Daeker, 35 Ohio App. 394, cert. denied, 172
N.E.2d 540 (1929).
5 It must be stated as presumably because the trustee actually had two areas in
which to exercise discretion. He had discretion to determine whether an emergency
existed and discretion to determine how much to pay out of the principal to alleviate
the emergency. It would seem that the settlor intended that some amount was to be
paid if the trustee determined that an emergency existed.
6 Adair v. Sharp, 49 Ohio App. 507, 199 N.E. 399 (1934); Restatement, Trusts
§ 152, comment c (1957). In Adair v. Sharp, the trustee had discretion to withhold in-
come and principal altogether from the beneficiary. The court held it to be a valid
spendthrift trust, but the reasoning they used was typical of that used in denying
persons the right to invade the interests created in a discretionary trust.
7 McWilliams v. McWilliams, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 535, 140 N.E.2d 80 (C.P. 1956).
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held that a valid spendthrift trust was created, the reasoning used in
denying the wife and children the right to recover was that applicable to
rights and interests involving discretionary trusts. The court held that
the wife and children could not maintain an action because the husband had
no interest within the state thus giving the court no jurisdiction. There
were included in the trust agreement express restraints on alienation, and
the better reasoning would have found that the restraints, which the
court recognized as valid, protect the beneficiary's interest even against
the wife and children.
McWilliams also announced an important policy consideration. The
court put great weight on the right of a private person to dispose of
property as he sees fit by saying "we believe that a person having the
absolute title to property, money, or personal property has the right to
dispose of it as he wishes . .. through proper testamentary disposition."
s
However, this policy argument was firmly denounced in O'Connor v.
O'Connor9 decided a year later. The settlor had included restraints on
alienation and provisions for forfeiture in the trust agreement. The husband-
beneficiary was receiving nothing at the time the action was brought;
but, upon the death of the person enjoying the life estate, the trustee
would have had to pay the beneficiary the monthly income from the
time of death and different amounts of principal at certain designated ages
of the beneficiary. The court, holding that the beneficiary's interest
in the spendthrift trust could be reached by the wife and children, stated
that the majority of states have recognized exceptions to the general
rule upholding restraints on alienation, and that it would be against
public policy to deny the dependents the right of invasion.",
Since the public policy consideration is to say the least arguable, one
further point merits consideration. In the McWilliams and O'Connor
cases, the beneficiary was a third person. The argument favoring the
8 Id. at 538, 140 N.E.2d at 82.
9 75 Ohio L. Abs. 420, 141 N.E.2d 691 (C.P. 1957).
10 Supra note 9. The following portions of the opinion are pertinent:
While the restraint here imposed would be respected in many jurisdictions
and an ordinary creditor would be precluded from invading the trust, the
distinct weight of authority makes some exceptions, especially in favor of a
claim by the beneficiary's wife and children.
In our view it would be clearly against public policy to deny dependents
the right of invasion. On the contrary, it seems clear there is an affirmative
public policy authorizing invasion for the benefit of the wife and children.
We therefore find and hold that the majority rule as quoted from the
Restatement of Trusts applies here and the husband's interest may and should
be subjected to the claims of the divorcing wife and dependent children.
For the view that the wife should not be entitled to invade corpus see Smyth v.
Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489 (1961). Although the case involved the wife's
right to a distributive share of trust property when taking against the husband's will, it
is relevant in that the husband's discretionary trust could not be invaded by the wife.
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unhampered disposition of property when the husband-settlor includes
himself as beneficiary seems less plausible.11
The following argument thus emerges in support of the rights of
the wife and children to invade the beneficiary's interest in the principal
case. The trust involved is not purely discretionary. The majority cited
Athorne v. Athorne12 in support of the conclusion that the trust they were
dealing with was a discretionary one. However, in that case the trustee
had discretion as to whether to pay anything at all. In the principal case
the trustee had no such discretion.13 If, instead, a spendthrift trust was
created, the McWilliams case cannot stand as authority for the propo-
sition that the restraints are valid as against the wife and children
because the case was not decided on that basis. The O'Connor case does
represent the majority view that in cases where actual spendthrift trusts
are created, the restraints on alienation are ineffective with respect to
the beneficiary's dependent wife and children.
11 Omitted from consideration is the legality of the question. Research disclosed
no Ohio cases directly in point, but see generally, Scott, Trusts § 156 (2 ed. 1956).
12 Athorne v. Athorne, 100 N.H. 413, 128 A.2d 910 (1957).
13 Supra note 6.
